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Abstract
In this paper we test in a controlled environment the impact of in-
cidental emotions induced through musical stimuli on individual risk-
taking behavior. A modified version of the Multiple Price List method
is used to elicit risk preference. We find that both positive and negat-
ive stimuli make experimental subjects more risk averse than subjects
in the neutral treatment. This result is obtained with respect to the
first lottery, while the impact of music on risk-taking is not statistically
significant in the subsequent lottery, meaning that its effect vanishes
as time elapses.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of the individual choices under risky decision making is tradi-
tionally explained by the Expected Utility Theory. Regarding this theory,
the concept of preference represents the key theoretical construct and there
is no place for individual cognitive ability, which conversely, according to a
behavioral viewpoint, stands for one of the most important determinants in
the field of choices under uncertainty. Indeed, this ability could be affected by
mood or emotion. Zajonc (1980) first showed that this ability is affected by
the mood or emotion experienced at the time of decision making. To give an-
other example, with respect to (Cumulative) Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky (1979); Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), Brandsta¨tter et al.
(2002) explained the commonly observed inverse S-shape of the probabil-
ity weighting function as a result from anticipated emotions concerning the
future realization of an uncertain payoff.
In this paper we assume that emotion plays a crucial role during the
process of decision making, referring to emotion as an intense feeling which
lasts for a short time. Our supposition is that the influence of mood or emo-
tions passes through the evaluation of monetary payoff or the estimation of
subjective probability, as Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) also state. In this way,
the so-called incidental emotion should have an effect on risk attitude, con-
sidering some studies by Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) and Pham (2007).
Since results in this research area are really heterogeneous, we want to give
a contribution in order to understand the impact of specific emotions on
playing different lotteries. Furthermore, some emotions can be universally
recognized if elicitated through the standards of western music (Fritz et al.
(2009), Vieillard et al. (2008)): this is one of the reasons why we use music
to induce happy and sad emotions in our experiment. We are also aware
of the distinction between emotion felt and emotion perceived (Gabrielsson,
2002), namely, between the emotion that listeners experience from listening
to a piece of music and their judgments about what emotion the music ex-
presses. Therefore, in the current work we assume a positive relationship
between the two cases, on the basis of some marketing experiments confirm-
ing our hypothesis (Milliman (1982), Milliman (1986), North et al. (1999)).
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After the so-called musical mood induction procedure, players are supposed
to choose among different lotteries with positive or negative expected value.
Images are also used to avoid an ineffective induction procedure. Although
this is a between subject experiment, we also take into account a measure of
risk aversion in order to control for subjects pre-induction risk attitude. Our
main novelty is that we measure the risk aversion by using the Multiple Price
List format in three lotteries: the first one with fixed probability, the second
one with fixed certain equivalent and the third one with negative outcome.
The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, in Section
2 we provide a discussion on the various definitions of emotion and on the
methods to elicit risk aversion. The setting of the experiment is described in
Section 3. The results of the laboratory experiment are presented in Section
4, where we put forward two measures of risk attitude and also discuss the
relationship between mood and risk aversion. Section 5 concludes.
2 Emotion definition and methods for elicit-
ing risk aversion
Since the last decade, the relation between risk aversion and emotion has
caught the attention of many economists, especially in the field of Experi-
mental Economics, and has been widely analyzed, leading some researchers
to the formulation of two opposed theories: the Affect Infusion Model (AIM)
(Forgas, 1995) and the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis (MMH) (Isen and
Patrick, 1983). On the one hand, the former approach suggests that good
mood brings to risk seeking behavior, that is people in a good mood perceive
the risky choice as more favorable. On the other hand, the latter thesis sup-
ports the opposite result, namely people in a good mood are usually more
risk averse than people in a bad mood, because they prefer to maintain their
own positive mood. Having a look at the experimental evidence, we observe
a really mixed context: some authors, like Nygren et al. (1996) and Chou
et al. (2007), find positive correlation between good mood and risk taking
behavior, instead other works, like Chuang and Lin (2007) as well as Kli-
ger and Levy (2003), show opposite results that support the MMH. Finally
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there are some works finding no clear results, such as the case of Drichoutis
and Nayga Jr (2013) who show both positive and negative emotions increase
the willingness to take risk, or Yuen and Lee (2003) finding out that only
negative emotion has an effect on risk aversion.
This conflicting evidence is probably due to two main causes, that is the
difference in meaning between mood and emotion, and the various elicitation
methods. Indeed, we usually use the terms mood, emotion and affect as
synonyms, but there is a clear distinction as far as Psychology is concerned.
According to Robbins and Judge (2012), affect defines a broad range of
feelings people experience, including both emotion as an intense short feeling
coming from a specific stimulus, and mood, defined as a less intense feeling
which lasts for a long time. It is also a well-known fact that strong emotions
turn into a mood. In the research area of decision making under risk there
is another important distinction between anticipated or expected emotion
and immediate emotion. As in Rick and Loewenstein (2008), the former
refers to predictions about the emotion agents will experience after knowing
the outcome of their own choice, whereas the latter refers to the immediate
reaction at the time of decision making, and in turn falls into one of two
categories. Indeed, even if connected with the consequences of one’s decision,
integral emotion is experienced at the time of decision making and provides
individuals with more thorough information about their own tastes. Finally,
incidental emotion is felt during decision making but totally unrelated to the
choice at hand, and represents the object of this paper.
Furthermore, regarding the problem of defining mood and emotion, it
has been shown that taking into account a generic definition like “positive
emotion” (or mood) or a specific definition like “happy” brings to differ-
ent results. For example, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) and Lerner and
Keltner (2001) show that fear, anger and sadness, usually classified as “neg-
ative emotion”, have a different impact on risk aversion with respect to each
other. Accordingly, in order to avoid typical ambiguity of the valence-based
approach (Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2006), in the current work we prefer to
focus on specific feelings, that is, happiness and sadness.
The second reason why the previous literature disagrees could be associ-
ated with the different experimental methodologies to elicit individual risk
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aversion. In accordance with Charness et al. (2013), we can cite among them:
• Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002). In this kind
of experiment the only task is to pump a series of virtual balls. For
each pump the participant wins 5 cents in a temporary account. At
whatever moment of game, the player can decide to move the amount
in a permanent account. In this case a new small ball appears. If the
balloon bursts before moving the money, then a new balloon appears
and the player loses his own amount. On the one hand, the larger
becomes the ball, the higher is the amount in the temporary account.
On the other hand, the burst probability increases with the dimension
of the ball. The measure of risk aversion is the adjusted number of
pumps. High number of pumps denotes risk loving people.
• The Gneezy and Potters method (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). In this
game players receive a certain amount, having to decide how much to
invest in a risky option which offers a certain dividend. The difference
between the initial amount and the investment in the risky choice is
kept by the player. The higher the investment, the lower the risk
aversion.
• Multiple Price List Method (MPL) (Binswanger, 1980). The task con-
sists in choosing within a list of paired lotteries. Each choice of the list
usually includes a safe lottery and a risky gamble. Players choose the
preferred option for each row. The sum of the safe choices of each list is
used as raw measure of risk aversion. The main feature of this method
is that each choice is associated with a specific coefficient of relative
risk aversion. This coefficient is computed under the assumption of a
specific form of the utility function, namely preferences are modeled
according to a Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function.
Since this is merely an exemplifying list, we refer the reader to Andersen
et al. (2006) for a review of the most relevant methods. Even though in the
text we are going to use the terms emotion and mood as interchangeable
words, in the current work we are specifically interested in understanding
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the impact of incidental happiness and sadness on risk aversion, by using a
multiple price list method to elicit risk preferences1.
3 Setting of the experiment
We conduct four different treatments in four different sessions, following the
same scheme in each one: (i) an initial stage in which, after a brief socioeco-
nomic questionnaire is handed out, we induce a specific emotion, (ii) then
a subsequent stage in which the subjects carry out a self-evaluation of the
emotion felt, and (iii) finally the participants make risky choices by using the
Multiple Price List method.
Since we are interested in analyzing the effect of different kinds of emotion
on risk aversion, we use incidental mood as control variable and, according
to a communicative theory of emotions (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 2008),
we assume that only four basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anxiety and
anger) can be evoked through music. Therefore, we try to induce sad or
happy emotion in addition to two neutral control treatments, relying on the
existence of several techniques to elicit a specific emotion, as Westermann
et al. (1996) also highlighted. Indeed, the mood induction procedure can
be classified as simple if only one of the techniques is used, or combined
in case more techniques are implemented together. Following some useful
advice (Mayer et al., 1995), we combine two of the eleven existent methods,
namely, images in addition to music, in order to avoid ineffective induction
procedures. In particular, we select a list of musical pieces which are supposed
to induce negative, positive or neutral condition; moreover, we choose sad,
happy or neutral pictures to be shown during the listening phase of the
respective treatments, in order to enhance the wished emotions. Therefore,
we run four different sessions:
• TREATMENT N in which the participants listen to few minutes of the
musical piece “Polymorphia” by Penderecki in order to induce negative
mood;
1In the same way, we are going to interchange the adjective happy with positive, as well
as sad with negative.
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Table 1: Treatments
Experimental Treatments Control Treatments
Treatment N Treatment P Treatment CM Treatment C
Participants 32 30 30 28
Mood Negative Positive Neutral Neutral
Music Polymorphia Mambo Symphony n.40 No music
• TREATMENT P in which we select Bernstein’s track “Mambo” in
order to induce positive mood;
• a control treatment TREATMENT CM in which we propose an excerpt
from the neutral piece “Symphony n.40” by Mozart2; and
• a control treatment TREATMENT C without music.
A summary of the whole induction procedure is shown in Table 1.
After the mood induction step, we ask players to report a self evaluation
of their own emotion in a scale ranging from 1 to 6 for each of four adjectives,
which vary depending on the treatment but always include either happy or
sad to make a comparison with the control treatment.
Finally, the risk aversion elicitation phase consists in three lotteries in
which we follow a scheme that is similar to that one proposed by Abdellaoui
(2000), Ding et al. (2010) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011), namely a list in which
players can choose either a risky option (i.e. a certain probability to win an
amount of money), or a safe amount. The main difference between our game
and that one proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) lies in the fact that Holt
and Laury considered a list of paired choices between two risky options, as
shown in Table 2.
2This piece of music is contained in a list of pieces that Va¨stfja¨ll (2002) judges to be
suitable for neutral conditions.
7
Table 2: Ten paired lottery proposed by Holt and Laury
Nr. Option A Option B
1 p = 1/10 of 100 p = 9/10 of 80 p = 1/10 of 190 p = 9/10 of 5
2 p = 2/10 of 100 p = 8/10 of 80 p = 2/10 of 190 p = 8/10 of 5
3 p = 3/10 of 100 p = 7/10 of 80 p = 3/10 of 190 p = 7/10 of 5
4 p = 4/10 of 100 p = 6/10 of 80 p = 4/10 of 190 p = 6/10 of 5
5 p = 5/10 of 100 p = 5/10 of 80 p = 5/10 of 190 p = 5/10 of 5
6 p = 6/10 of 100 p = 4/10 of 80 p = 6/10 of 190 p = 4/10 of 5
7 p = 7/10 of 100 p = 3/10 of 80 p = 7/10 of 190 p = 3/10 of 5
8 p = 8/10 of 100 p = 2/10 of 80 p = 8/10 of 190 p = 2/10 of 5
9 p = 9/10 of 100 p = 1/10 of 80 p = 9/10 of 190 p = 1/10 of 5
10 p = 10/10 of 100 p = 0/10 of 80 p = 10/10 of 190 p = 0/10 of 5
The MPL format is very simple and it is one of the most used formats
to elicit individual risk aversion. Andersen et al. (2006) analyze the use
of the MPL in different fields and they highlight the pros and cons of this
approach. The main advantage is the simplicity of the structure, while the
main disadvantage is the possibility of having multiple switching. Charness
et al. (2013) suggest that the problem of multiple switching is due to the
misunderstanding of the instruction and, accordingly, of the game.3 On the
contrary, Andersen et al. (2006) argue that this kind of behavior can be
considered as indifference between choices. As we will see, we also find a
large percentage of inconsistent choices (in the first lottery). In our setting
we include an explicit option for indifference between the safe and the risky
choices. This means that the inconsistent behavior is probably due to a lack
of attention or to a scarce comprehension of the instructions (see below for
further details).
3For example, Jacobson and Petrie (2009) in a field experiment found 55% of incon-
sistent choices.
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Our lotteries, whose specification is shown in Table 3, Table 4 and Table
5, have the following peculiarities:
• Lottery 1: the safe choice ranges from 100 to 190, while the amount
and the win probability of the risky choice are constant.
• Lottery 2: the safe choice is constant and equal to 100, whereas the
win probability gradually increases from 0 to 1.
• Lottery 3: whilst the safe choice is a constant loss equal to −20, the
risky choice is represented by the increasing probability to lose 100%.
For the sake of simplicity, we call Option A and Option B the choices in
all the three lotteries and, concerning the risky option, we impose the choice
between a certain amount of money and zero to make the game as clear
as possible and avoid misunderstandings, as suggested in Plott and Zeiler
(2005).
Table 3 shows the lottery in which we fix gamble and variable riskless amount:
we expect that a risk neutral person will choose Option A six times before
switching to Option B.
Table 4 shows the lottery in which we fix the amount of the safe choice, while
the win probability changes in the Option B : we expect that a risk neutral
person will choose Option A four times before switching to Option B.
Finally, Table 5 shows the lottery defined in the loss-domain: players have
to choose between a small sure loss and a risky option in which they have
a certain probability to lose 0. In this case, we expect that a risk neutral
person will choose Option B two times before switching to Option A.
The experiment was conducted in May 2014 in the Laboratory of the
Faculty of Economics “Giorgio Fua`”, Universita` Politecnica delle Marche
(Ancona, Italy) and involved 120 participants (58 female), paid according
to the decisions made during the game in order to increase the incentive to
behave correctly and reveal true preferences. Indeed, regarding each parti-
cipant we randomly drew one of his choices in each lottery and paid him
in accordance with the sum of these values. Having randomly assigned par-
ticipants to one of the four sessions, we read aloud the instructions at the
beginning of each turn and then players took place in their own cubicle. After
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Table 3: Lottery 1
Choice number Option A Option B
p = 1/2 p = 1/2
1 100 300 0
2 110 300 0
3 120 300 0
4 130 300 0
5 140 300 0
6 150 300 0
7 160 300 0
8 170 300 0
9 180 300 0
10 190 300 0
Table 4: Lottery 2
Choice number Option A Option B
1 100 p = 1/10 250 p = 9/10 0
2 100 p = 2/10 250 p = 8/10 0
3 100 p = 3/10 250 p = 7/10 0
4 100 p = 4/10 250 p = 6/10 0
5 100 p = 5/10 250 p = 5/10 0
6 100 p = 6/10 250 p = 4/10 0
7 100 p = 7/10 250 p = 3/10 0
8 100 p = 8/10 250 p = 2/10 0
9 100 p = 9/10 250 p = 1/10 0
10 100 p = 10/10 250 p = 0/10 0
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Table 5: Lottery 3
Choice number Option A Option B
1 -20 p = 1/10 -100 p = 9/10 0
2 -20 p = 2/10 -100 p = 8/10 0
3 -20 p = 3/10 -100 p = 7/10 0
4 -20 p = 4/10 -100 p = 6/10 0
5 -20 p = 5/10 -100 p = 5/10 0
6 -20 p = 6/10 -100 p = 4/10 0
7 -20 p = 7/10 -100 p = 3/10 0
8 -20 p = 8/10 -100 p = 2/10 0
9 -20 p = 9/10 -100 p = 1/10 0
10 -20 p = 10/10 -100 p = 0/10 0
starting the game, the participants read again the instructions in their own
screen, filled in the questionnaire and were invited to put on the headphones
to get involved in the feeling suggested by music and images. At this point,
we asked them to report their own emotions on a range from 1 to 6. Before
Lottery 2 and Lottery 3, they listened to 30 seconds of the musical piece
again and looked at a subselection of the same images, in order to avoid the
change of the induced mood. The experiment lasted about 40 minutes and
the average payment was 8 Euro.
4 Results
In this section we show and comment the results of our experiment. Firstly,
we describe the setup and the results of the mood induction procedure.
Secondly, we analyze the results of each lottery by providing a rough measure
of risk proclivity. Finally, a more refined measure of risk aversion is applied
to our experimental results.
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Figure 1: Positive and negative mood in all treatments
4.1 Mood induction
Moving to the first part of the analysis which concerns the validation of
the mood induction procedure, first of all we compare the moods elicited
in the control treatments and we find no significant differences.4 Thanks to
this result, from this moment on we are able to take into account only the
TREATMENT CM. In Figure 1 we show the boxplot of the reported emotion
in the considered treatments.
At this point we run a Wilcoxon rank sum test in order to check for
validity of the mood induction, comparing the control treatment with the
experimental treatments. As we can notice through the results shown in
Table 6, the non parametric test rejects the null hypothesis, so the median
of the control treatment and those ones of the experimental treatments are
significantly different.
4Neither as for the adjective sad (z = 0.599; p-value = 0.549), nor as for happy (z =
0.202; p-value = 0.839) the Wilcoxon rank sum test finds significant differences between
the two control treatments.
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Table 6: Median comparison of inducted moods
Statistics test
Treatment N vs Treatment CM Treatment P vs Treatment CM
Wilcoxon z= -4.96 z= 1.97
p-value (0.00) (0.05)
Having proved the validity of the mood induction procedure, we can go
on to the second step of our analysis, in which the results of choices under
risk are presented separately for each lottery. Data related to Lottery 3 will
not be exploited in this analysis, due to incompatibility of the loss domain
structure with the measures of risk attitude that we are going to use.5
4.2 Rough indicator of risk proclivity
As stated in the previous section, in this phase of the experiment we use a
tweaked version of the MPL format due to its simplicity and appropriateness
for eliciting individual risk aversion. When highlighting the pros and cons
of this approach in different fields, Andersen et al. (2006) stress such an
understandability of the structure as main advantage, whereas indicate the
possibility of having multiple switching as chief drawback.6 On the one hand,
the same authors argue that this kind of behavior could be seen as indifference
between choices, but on the other hand Charness et al. (2013) suggest that
the problem of multiple switching could be due to the misunderstanding of
the instructions.
As said before, we find large percentages of inconsistent choices, notably
in the first lottery. Since we included an explicit option for indifference
between the safe and the risky choices, our conclusion is that inconsistent
5These data will be used for future investigations focused on loss aversion.
6For example, Jacobson and Petrie (2009) n a field experiment found 55% of inconsist-
ent choices.
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behavior is arguably due to lack of attention or scarce grasp of instructions.
In confirmation of this, after the first lottery the number of inconsistent
choices seems to decrease in all treatments, thanks to learning effect.
In the first lottery the probability of the risky choice is held constant and
equal to 50%, while the amount of the certain lottery gradually increases
from 100 to 190.
As Holt and Laury (2002) pointed out, the total number of safe choices
can be used as rough indicator of risk aversion. In Figure 2, we show the
proportion of risky choices made by players in each treatment. Having drawn
a grey dotted line to indicate the prediction under the hypothesis of risk
neutrality, in the graph the percentage of risky choices falls very quickly
after the fifth choice in TREATMENT P and in TREATMENT N. Whereas,
in the control treatment nearly 40% of people still prefer the risky option
until the last choice.
Since the players in a neutral mood seem to be more risk lovers than the
others, such a result could suggest that the induction of positive or negative
emotions increased risk aversion.
In order to check if our graphical analysis is significant, we compare such
choices by running parametric and nonparametric tests, whose results are
shown in Table 7. In both cases the tests reject the null hypothesis, un-
derlining that the participants in a positive or negative mood actually were
more risk averse than individuals in a neutral mood.
Furthermore, no noteworthy results come out of the comparison between
Treatment P and Treatment N.7
The second lottery differs from the previous one with respect to two
peculiarities: in this case the safe choices are held constant and equal to 100,
while the probability of winning in the risky choices increases from 0.1 to 1.
Moreover, in such a lottery the rational behavior predicts that risk neutral
individuals choose the safe choice four times before switching to the risky
choice.
Like for the previous lottery, in Figure 3 we illustrate the risky choices
7We tested if the difference between the risky choices in Treatment P and in Treatment
N is significant, but both test are not able to reject the null hypothesis (t = 0.97; p-value
= 0.166; z = 1.051; p-value = 0.29).
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Figure 2: Percentage of risky choices by treatment - Lottery 1
Table 7: Mean/median comparison of risky choices - Lottery 1
Statistics test
Treatment N vs Treatment CM Treatment P vs Treatment CM
t-test t= -2.89 t= -1.92
p-value (0.00) (0.06)
Wilcoxon z= 3.20 z= -2.51
p-value (0.00) (0.01)
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Table 8: Mean/median comparison of risky choices - Lottery 2
Statistics test
Treatment N vs Treatment CM Treatment P vs Treatment CM
t-test t= -0.37 t= 0.23
p-value (0.71) (0.82)
Wilcoxon z= -0.21 z= 0.62
p-value (0.83) (0.53)
made by players in each treatment, considering the fact that any risk neutral
individual should switch to the risky option at the fifth choice. This time, at
first sight nothing can be said about potential divergent patterns of behavior
among treatments, since no line seems to stand out from the maze. Such an
impression is confirmed by parametric and nonparametric tests in Table 8,
where no differences between groups have been found.
Summing up, in Lottery 1 both participants in a good mood and those
ones in a bad mood were more risk averse than people in a neutral mood,
but this evidence disappeared in Lottery 2.
In addition, in the two lotteries we have found plenty of inconsistent
choices. In order to depict this tendency, we generate a dummy which is equal
to 1 if the choice made is consistent, namely if the switching point is unique:
Figure 4 shows that, on average, nearly 40% of players made a mistake in
Lottery 1. Due to the size of such a phenomenon, we have decided to analyze
the data by considering only the consistent choices. Anyway, Figure 5 reveals
that the percentage of consistent choices increases to nearly 90% in Lottery
2, thanks to learning effect.
4.3 Arrow-Pratt index of relative risk aversion
In the previous subsection we have taken into account a rough index of risk
proclivity, namely, the sum of risky choices per subject. Since the preliminary
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result suggests that both positive and negative emotion lead to less risk-
taking behavior, in this paragraph we try to enhance such an outcome by
introducing a more complex measure of risk aversion. Unlike Holt and Laury
(2002), who constructed their price list under the hypothesis that preferences
should be represented by a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function, we do not make any assumption about the utility function, only
supposing that it is a concave function such that:
∂u
∂m
> 0
∂2u
∂m2
< 0
Following Guiso and Paiella (2008) approach, we calculate the Arrow-
Pratt index of relative risk aversion by considering a second-order Taylor
expansion of the utility function around the initial value m. The generic
expected utility function is given by:
Eu = pu(x1) + (1− p)u(x2) = Eu(X˜)
where p is the probability to win the prize x1 and (1−p) is the probability
to win x2, with (˜X) as expected payoff of the lottery.
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The Taylor expansion is given by:
Eu(X˜) ' u(m) + u′(m)E(X˜) + 0.5u′′(m)E(X˜)2 (1)
We consider the certain utility u(m) as the utility of receiving the certain
amount in the lottery. Taking into account the certain utility and the expec-
ted utility we obtain the following specifications for Lottery 1 (Equation 2)
and Lottery 2 (Equation 3):
u(m) =
1
2
u(300) +
1
2
u(0) m ∈ (100, 190) (2)
u(100) = pu(250) + (1− p)u(0) p ∈ (0.1, 1) (3)
The Arrow-Pratt index (Pratt) is equal to:
pi = −u
′′(m)
u′(m)
which is a measure of the concavity of the utility function. Then we
combine equation 1 and equations 2 and 3, obtaining:
pi1 =
2(150−m)
1502 +m2
(4)
pi2 =
2(p(250)− 100)
(p(250))2 + 1002
(5)
Using Equations 4 and 5 we get two series of ten values for the Arrow-
Pratt coefficient of risk aversion which correspond to each possible switching
point. The latter is (i) equal to 0 and such that the certain amount is equal
to the expected value of the risky choice, if the player is risk neutral; (ii)
negative if the player is risk lover, or (iii) positive if the player is risk averse.
Considering the values of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient in Table 9, we assign
a measure of risk aversion to each player in all the treatments and show the
results for Lottery 1 and Lottery 2 respectively in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
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Table 9: Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion
Lottery 1 Lottery 2
N. of safe choice γ γ
1 0.0031 -0.0141
2 0.0023 -0.008
3 0.0016 -0.0032
4 0.0010 0
5 0.0005 0.0020
6 0 0.0031
7 -0.0004 0.0037
8 -0.0008 0.004
9 -0.0011 0.0041
10 -0.0014 0.0041
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Figure 6: Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion - Lottery 1
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Figure 7: Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion - Lottery 2
It is worth pointing out that, albeit to different extents, both lotteries
display the highest percentages of risk lover individuals in Treatment CM.
In order to get a clear-cut visual impact, we summarize such an outcome in
Figure 8, where we assign the labels -1, 0 and 1 respectively to the negative,
null and positive values of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient. Observing the graph,
the percentage of risk lover players in Lottery 1 is smaller than 30% if we
consider either Treatment N or Treatment P, whereas this percentage is much
bigger in Treatment CM, exceeding 70%. A similar tendency comes out of
Lottery 2, the percentage of risk lover individuals does not even reach 10%
in all treatments.
At this point we run the nonparametric test in order to check for statistic-
ally significant differences and show the results in Table 10. As far as Lottery
1 is concerned, the Wilcoxon rank sum test rejects the null hypothesis of no
differences between the compared median values, indicating that both the
subjects in a bad mood (Treatment N) and the individuals in a good mood
(Treatment P) revealed themselves as more risk averse than the players in a
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Table 10: Median comparison of Arrow-Pratt coefficients
Statistics test
Treatment N vs CM Treatment P vs CM
Lottery 1 Wilcoxon t= -2.10 t= -2.06
p-value (0.03) (0.04)
Lottery 2 Wilcoxon z= 0.27 z= -0.79
p-value (0.79) (0.43)
neutral mood (Treatment CM). Instead, in Lottery 2 the test fails to reject
the null hypothesis, suggesting that the participants followed similar beha-
vioral patterns regardless of the treatment of origin. Basically, such results
reflect those ones coming out previously by using the rough indicator of risk
proclivity, namely the total number of risky choices per subject. Therefore,
players not in a neutral mood (i.e., both happy and sad ones) made more
conservative choices, leading to results that are a mixture of the predictions
by the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) and the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis
(MMH).
We justify such a behavior in Lottery 1 by supposing that people are aware
of their own scarce mental alertness and, accordingly, prefer not to take risks.
Such an explanation is coherent with the view that choice behavior is the joint
product of a deliberative system focused on broader goals and an affective
system driven by emotions and motivational states (Loewenstein et al., 2015).
In addition, since we classified the affect arising from the musical stimulus
as emotion, that is, an intense temporary feeling, we actually do not observe
the same effect on players during Lottery 2. In other words, the emotional
status tends to vanish as time elapses.
In order to understand whether our findings can actually be attributed to
the musical stimulus, by resorting again to the Arrow-Pratt index we check
for the initial level of risk aversion, that we had elicited through the following
question before broadcasting the music:
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Figure 8: Fraction of risk averse, risk neutral and risk lover players
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Table 11: Mean/median comparison of Arrow Pratt coefficients - Initial ques-
tion
Statistics test
Treatment N vs Treatment CM Treatment P vs Treatment CM
t-test t= 0.59 t= 0.73
p-value (0.56) (0.47)
Wilcoxon z= -0.85 z= 0.98
p-value (0.39) (0.33)
• “You are given the opportunity to buy a financial product which with
the same probability allows you to win 1000 Euro or to lose the invested
sum. How much are you willing to pay for such a financial product?”
This time we calculate the Arrow-Pratt coefficient in the ensuing way:
pi3 = 2(1000− zi)/(10002 + z2i ) (6)
where zi is the amount invested by the single participant.
As depicted in Table 11, both parametric and nonparametric test find
no differences between groups, namely the subjects in the treatment groups
seem to be initially as risk-averse as those ones in the control group. Accord-
ingly, as it emerges from the question preceding the musical procedure, after
the mood induction the subjects exposed to “positive” or “negative” stimuli
exhibit more risk averse choices than the subjects exposed to a “neutral”
stimulus. This fact enhances the results of the study.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the results of a laboratory experiment on the effect
of incidental emotions on risk-taking behavior. In particular, we tested in a
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controlled environment the potential of musical stimuli to induce “positive”,
“negative” or “neutral” moods that, in turn, may affect the behavior of
individuals when facing risky choices. A modified version of the well-known
Multiple Price List method is used to elicit individuals’ risk preferences.
The main finding of the paper is that individuals are more risk averse after
both the positive and negative musical mood inductions than those exposed
to a neutral treatment. Images are also used during mood induction to avoid
an ineffective treatment. This result is statistically significant for the first
lottery the experimental subjects were given, while the effect gets lost in
the second lottery, meaning that the musical stimulus induces a temporary
mood with vanishing effects on risk-taking behavior. A further confirmation
of our findings is that we observe individuals’ risk behavior before and after
the experimental treatments, noticing that all the participants are ex-ante
characterized by similar risk attitude, while greater risk aversion is detected
ex-post.
Our results basically confirm a deducible fact, namely, that music is able
to affect our mood. Indeed, sometimes we need some music to be “in the
mood”. Interestingly enough, musical mood induction may have some relev-
ant implications on economic and financial decision-making, but even this
fact is not new, as marketing operators know. For instance, think about the
effect that Mendelssohn’s or Wagner’s wedding march broadcast in a shop
can have on the buying decision during the wedding dress fitting, perhaps
while walking on a red carpet surrounded by mirrors. We show that music
can also affect risk-taking, thus adding new findings to a literature which is
still in its infancy. Given that we find a similar effect on individual risk-taking
of both the irresistible joy infused by the Orquesta Sinfo´nica Simo´n Bolivar
conducted by Gustavo Dudamel and the distressing atmosphere instilled by
Penderecki’s Polymorphia, a possible interpretation is that musical stimuli
which are able to influence positively or negatively our mood lead us to im-
prove concentration and focus more on the subject, that in our experiment
results in greater risk aversion. Definitely, additional research is needed to
further assess the emotional impact of music on individual risk-taking.
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